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CRIMINAL LAW-THE NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A LOCAL 
KILLING: WHEN DOES "INTERSTATE" MEAN INTRASTATE UNDER 
THE FEDERAL MURDER-FoR-HIRE STATUTE, 18 U.S.c. § 1958? 
INTRODUCTION 
A neighborhood drug deal goes awry, leaving one party short a 
significant sum of cash to a rising competitor. Angry, the party on 
the short end of the transaction wants his new competitor killed and 
telephones an acquaintance, just blocks away, to cash in a favor. 
After some negotiation, the deal is closed, and, shortly thereafter, a 
man dies. Or, the contractor drives the two blocks to deliver the 
proposition in person and to pay in cash. Throughout their interac­
tions, the parties to this hired murder never leave the familiar turf 
of their hometown. The conduct in either of these scenarios is en­
tirely intrastate, and the criminal activity local in nature, though it 
involves the use of facilities that are a part of interstate commerce. 
Under 18 U.S.c. § 1958,1 it is a federal crime to use "any facil­
ity in interstate ... commerce," with the intent that a murder be 
committed for pay.2 The courts have difficulty resolving what it 
means to use a "facility in interstate commerce" in this context.3 
1. 18 U.S.c. § 1958 (2000). 
2. Section 1958 reads in relevant part: 
(a) Whoever travels in or causes another (including the intended victim) to 
travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes another (includ­
ing the intended victim) to use the mail or any facility in interstate or 
foreign commerce, with the intent that a murder be committed in violation 
of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the re­
ceipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything 
of pecuniary value, or who conspires to do so, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both .... 
(b) As used in this section and section 1959 
(2) "facility of interstate commerce" includes means of transportation and 
communications .... 
[d. 
3. See United States v. Marek, 198 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1999), affd en bane, 238 
F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), eert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001); ef. Marek, 238 F.3d at 324 
97 

98 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:97 
The disagreement is focused on whether § 1958 is limited to con­
duct or activity that crosses state boundaries, or whether it regu­
lates any use of an interstate commerce facility, regardless of the 
nature of the particular transaction. The question is twofold. First, 
it must be determined whether it is the particular "use" of the facil­
ity that must be in interstate commerce, or merely that the facility 
itself must be a part of interstate commerce, regardless of the na­
ture of the particular use. Second, it must be determined what de­
gree of interaction with interstate commerce is required. 
The increasingly complex and expansive nature of communica­
tions technology magnifies the problems associated with interpret­
ing the reach of federal jurisdiction where· such jurisdiction is 
founded on the use of interstate commerce facilities.4 The infra­
structure that modem communication devices rely upon "blurs the 
line between interstate and intrastate activity."5 This infrastructure 
routes calls through its respective network based on a variety of 
factors.6 There is little, if any, relationship between the physical 
proximity of the parties communicating and the actual path of com­
munication over the network used. A call to your neighbor, for 
example, may actually travel to a~othe:r ~tate and back before ring­
ing next door.7 
Section 1958 allows two interpretations, each with significantly 
different implications. Under a broad interpretation of § 1958, it is 
a federal crime to use any facility in arranging a murder-for-hire, so 
long as the facility itself is of the type generally engaged in inter­
state commerce. Under the narrower view, the perpetrator, 
through the use of the facility, must initiate activity that crosses 
state lines to bring the crime within federal jurisdiction. The 
(Jolly, J., dissenting); United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999). See infra 
Part II for a discussion of these two cases and the resulting circuit split. 
4. See, e.g., Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another 
Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31' COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61 (1997). 
5. Hillary B. Miller & Robert R. Biggerstaff, Application of the Telephone Con­
sumer Protection Act to Interstate Telemarketing and Faxes, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 682 
(2000) (discussing, in part, the current state of communications technology). 
6. See id. 
7. See, e.g., United States v. Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (D. Utah 1998) 
(finding that a message sent between two computers located in Utah just four miles 
apart traveled interstate), affd, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Stevens, 
842 F. Supp. 96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that the electronic signal used by a paging 
system to communicate between two parties within the same state traveled across three 
states); see also Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 5, at 682-84 (discussing the constitu­
tionality of federal regulation of electronic communication). For a discussion of the 
Stevens holding, see infra Part LB.1. 
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broader view makes wholly intrastate criminal activity, namely 
murder, which has traditionally been a matter of state jurisdiction, a 
federal crime simply through the use of interstate commerce facili­
ties. Under this broad interpretation the contractor of the opening 
hypothetical has committed a federal crime under either of the sce­
narios, as he used a "facility of interstate commerce" to arrange the 
hired murder.8 
An apparent inconsistency in the text of § 1958 further trou­
bles courts in their attempts to interpret the statute's jurisdictional 
reach. In drafting the murder-for-hire statute, Congress used two 
different phrases in separate subsections of the statute in a manner 
that suggests that they carry the same meaning. Section 1958(a), 
which sets forth the elements of the criminal offense, applies to any­
one who "uses any facility in interstate ... commerce."9 Section 
1958(b), however, which sets out definitions for terms used in 
§ 1958(a), defines "facility of interstate commerce" as including 
"means of transportation and communication."lo The phrase "facil­
ity of interstate commerce" does not otherwise appear in the 
statute. 
Recent decisions froin the Fifth and Sixth Circuits present con­
flicting interpretations of § 1958. The Sixth Circuit, in United States 
v. Weathers,u limited § 1958 in application to conduct that crosses 
state lines. The Weathers court found no acceptable way to resolve 
the discrepancy between § 1958(a) and § 1958(b), and, therefore, 
based its interpretation solely on the language contained in 
§ 1958(a), as it comprised the substantive section of the statute.12 
Accordingly, the Weathers court found that the defendant's use of a 
cell phone triggered § 1958 because it relied on communication 
towers across state lines. 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit found method in the legislature's 
madness, determining that the definitional phrase used in § 1958(b) 
acted to clarify the terms used in § 1958(a).13 In United States v. 
8. See Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 324 (Jolly, J., dissenting). The courts have deter­
mined that both telephones and automobiles are themselves "instrumentalities of inter­
state commerce." See infra notes 139-142 and accompanying text (discussing various 
instrumentalities that constitute facilities of interstate commerce). . 
9.· 18 U.S.c. § 1958(a) (2000) (emphasis added). See supra note 2 for the text of 
the murder-for-hire statute. 
10. 18 U.S.c. § 1958(b) (2000) (emphasis added). 
11. 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999). 
12. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the holding in Weathers. 
13. See infra Part n.B for a discussion of the holding in Marek. 
100 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:97 
Marek,14 the Fifth Circuit extended the jurisdictional reach of 
§ 1958 to any use of a facility, so long as the facility was a facility of 
interstate commerce. In Marek, the defendant triggered federal ju­
risdiction through an intrastate transfer of funds over Western 
Union, a banking facility with an interstate network. 
Part I of this note examines the legislative history and common 
law background of 18 U.S.c. § 1958, beginning with its inception as 
an amendment to the Travel Act, 18 U.S.c. § 1952. Part II dis­
cusses Weathers and Marek, two conflicting opinions issued respec­
tively by the Sixth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit. 
Part III of this note analyzes the varying interpretations of the 
jurisdictional reach of § 1958, and argues for a narrower interpreta­
tion of § 1958. Part III argues that a plain meaning reading of 
§ 1958 lends itself to a narrower interpretation of the statute, and 
that § 1958(b )(2) serves only to clarify the types of facilities that 
come within the scope of § 1958(a). In addition, though the legisla­
tive history of § 1958 evidences a general intent by Congress to 
grant jurisdiction broadly, Congress never actually contemplated 
wholly intrastate activity; Congress gave no clear indication that it 
intended to regulate wholly intrastate criminal activity, an area tra­
ditionally within state jurisdiction. This note concludes, first, that 
federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.c. § 1958 should be limited to ac­
tivity that crosses state boundaries, and, second, that the degree of 
interaction must be substantial, more substantial than required in 
either United States v. Weathers 15 or United States v. Marek. 16 
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMON LAW 

BACKGROUND OF 18 U.S.c. § 1958 

A. Legislative History of 18 U.S.c. § 1958 
Congress originally drafted the federal murder-for-hire statute, 
18 U.S.c. § 1958, as an amendment to the Travel Act, 18 U.S.c. 
§ 1952.1' The Travel Act, enacted by Congress in 1961, is a product 
of proposed legislation introduced by Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy to Congress as part of a program aimed at organized 
14. 198 F.3d 532 (5th CiT. 1999), affd en bane, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), eert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001). 
15. 169 F.3d 336 (6th CiT. 1999). 
16. 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001). 
17. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1002(a), 98 
Stat. 2136. 
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crime and racketeering.18 Attorney General Kennedy sought to 
bring the crime fighting resources of the Federal Government to 
the aid of local law enforcement authorities in situations where the 
particular interstate nature of the crime was such that it could not 
be handled effectively by local authorities.19 
As originally enacted, the Travel Act was a general prohibition 
against interstate travel or the use of "facilities in interstate com­
merce" in furtherance of "unlawful activity," and did not specifi­
cally mention murder-for-hire. In 1984, Congress added a 
subsection to the Travel Act, § 1952A, which mirrored the specific 
statutory language of § 1952, though narrowed the focus from un­
lawful activity to murder-for-hire.2° In 1988, Congress re-desig­
nated § 1952A as § 1958.21 Thus, the statutory language now 
comprising § 1958 was initially part of the Travel Act. This lan­
guage evolved through a series of compromises between different 
bills passed separately by the Senate and by House of Representa­
tives in the process of enacting the Travel Act.22 
1. 	 The Travel Act and Attorney General Kennedy's 
Legislative Proposa\ to Fight Organized Crime 
and Racketeering 
As originally introduced in the Senate, the Attorney General's 
proposed bill criminalized travel between states for the purposes of 
furthering certain illegal activities.23 Specifically, the bill would 
have made it a federal crime to "travel[] in interstate or foreign 
commerce with intent to- (1) distribute the proceeds of any unlaw­
18. See Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to the Vice President 
(Apr. 6, 1961), S. REp. No. 87-644, at 4 (1961); S. REP. No. 87-644, at 3 (1961) (quoting 
the Attorney General's testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee); The Attor­
ney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings Before the 
Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th Congo 1 (1961) (discussing the proposed bill and possible 
implications of its provisions and recommending certain amendments); H. REP. No. 87­
966 (1961), reprinted in 1961 V.S.C.C.A.N. 2664, 2664-67 (discussing the bill as drafted 
by the Senate, the purpose to be achieved by the bill, and making certain amendments); 
H.R. CONF. REp. No. 87-1161 (1961) (recommending that the final version of the bill, as 
amended by the House, be passed). See generally Martin R. Pollner, Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 
28 BROOK. L. REv. 37, 39 (1961). 
19. 	 S. REP. No. 87-644, at 3-4. 
20. 	 Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 1002(a). 
21. 	 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7053(a), 102 Stat. 4181. 
22. 	 Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498. 
23. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 
5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Congo 20, 24 (1961); S. REp. No. 87-644, at 
1. 
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ful activity; or (2) commit any crime of violence to further any un­
lawful activity; or (3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry 
on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, carry­
ing on, of any unlawful activity ...."24 The Attorney General 
drafted the proposed bill with organized crime as the "clear tar­
get. "25 The primary purpose was to enable the Federal Govern­
ment "to take effective action against the racketeer who conducts 
an unlawful business, but lives far from the scene in comfort and 
safety."26 As proposed, the Attorney General clearly intended that 
the crossing of a state or national boundary in furtherance of these 
"unlawful activities" be an essential component of the prohibited 
activity.27 "The bill which I submit to the Congress would impose 
criminal sanctions upon the person whose work takes him across 
State or National boundaries in aid of certain 'unlawful 
activities."'28 
The Senate Judiciary Committee made several amendments to 
the Attorney General's proposed bill.29 These amendments were in 
part to satisfy concern within the Senate about the far-reaching na­
ture of the bill in some respects,3o and also concern that the bill was 
not broad enough in other respects.31 ,As a result, the Committee 
broadened the reach of the bill by including the use of interstate 
facilities, in addition to the actual physical crossing of a state 
boundary by the perpetrator, in the jurisdictional trigger of the pro­
posed statute.32 To accomplish this, the Committee added a second 
section to the proposed bill, which stated that "[w]hoever uses any 
facility for transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, includ­
ing the mail, with intent to [commit any of the acts prohibited in the 
24. See S. REP. No. 87-644, at 5; PoHner, supra note 18, at 39. 
25. S. REP; No. 87-644, at 3 ("The travel that would be banned is travel 'in fur­
therance of a business enterprise' which involves gambling, liquor, narcotics, and prosti­
tution offenses or extortion or bribery." (quoting the Attorney General's testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee». 
26. The Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: 
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 18, at 15. 
27. Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to the Vice President 
(Apr. 6, 1961), S. REP. No. 87-644, at 4 (1961). 
28. Id. 
29. See S. REP. No. 87-644, at 1-2. 
30. See id. at 2 (explaining the connection between travel and the unlawful acts in 
the proposed bill). 
31. 107 CONGo REC. 13,943 (1961) ("The committee is of the opinion that the bill 
should not be limited to the travel of individuals in interstate commerce. Other inter­
state transportation facilities may be used by organized crime to carry out unlawful 
activity."). 
32. S. REP. No. 87-644, at 5-6. 
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first section of the proposed statute shall be subject to the same 
punishments]."33 With these same amendments, however, the Sen­
ate limited the reach of the proposed statute by specifically enumer­
ating the acts to which the bill would apply34 and by requiring a 
substantive connection between the travel and the enumerated pro­
hibited act.35 
Upon receiving the Senate's final draft of the bill, the House of 
Representatives characterized the purpose of the Senate bill as to 
"prohibit travel in interstate or foreign commerce or the use of the 
facilities of interstate or foreign commerce, including themail.in 
the aid of racketeering enterprises."36 With this interpretation, and 
also upon hearing testimony by. Attorney General Kennedy, the 
House Judiciary Committee drafted and passed its own version of 
the bill.37 The House merged the two sections proposed by the Sen­
ate into one section, so that anyone who "travel[ ed] in interstate or 
foreign commerce or use[d] any facility in interstate or foreign com­
merce including the mail" would be within the reach of the Act.38 
In merging the two sections, the House omitted the words "for 
transportation" following the word "facility," and, in so doing, 
adopted the language now found in the current version of the mur­
der-for-hire statute.39 
Congress appointed a Conference Committee to resolve the 
differences between the versions of the bill passed 'by the Senate 
and the House.4o The Committee recommended the merged ver­
33. . Id. at 1-2. The section added by the Senate Judiciary Committee read: 
Sec. 2. Transportation in commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises. 
(a) 	Whoever uses any facility for transportation in interstate or foreign com­
merce, including the mail, with intent to­
(1) 	distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or 
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or 
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the pro­
motion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful 
activity and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts 
specified in subparagraphs ..... 
Id. 	at 5-6. See id. for a full version of the bill passed by the Senate. 
34. S. REp. No. 87-644, at 3, 5-6. 
35. Id. at 2. "[T]o come within the proviSions of the bill some activity in further­
ance of a racketeering enterprise, subsequent to the performance of the travel, must 
take place and that accordingly the gravamen of the offense will be travel and a further 
overt act to aid the enterprise." Id. 
36. H. REp. No. 87-966 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664, 2664-65. 
37. Id. at 2666-67 
38. Id. at 2666. 
39. See infra note 44 for the text of the murder-for-hire statute as originally 
passed. 
40. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 87-1161, at 1-2 (1961). 
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sion of the bill as amended by the House,41 which was ultimately 
accepted in both houses of Congress and passed into law.42 
Neither the Conference Committee Report nor the House Re­
port gave any indication that the House intended the merging of 
the two sections of the Senate ' bill, or the omission of "for transpor­
tation," to be a substantive change. However, had the Senate ver­
sion passed, the scope of the bill would have been limited to the use 
of transportation facilities, whereas the final version of the bill ex­
tends to the use of any facility.43 
2. The Federal Murder-For-Hire Statute 
Congress later adopted the language it used in defining the ju­
risdictional reach of the Travel Act directly into what today is the 
federal murder-for-hire statute. As part of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress added two sections to 18 
U.S.c. § 1952, § 1952A, addressing murder-for-hire, and § 1952B, 
addressing contract murders and other violent crimes by organized 
crime figures.44 Congress limited § 1952A to punish "the travel in 
interstate or foreign commerce or the use of the facilities of inter­
state or foreign commerce or of the mails, as consideration for the 
receipt of anything of pecuniary value, with the intent that a murder 
be committed."45 The language contained in this subsection of the 
Travel Act, as it, pertained to the interstate nexus requirement to 
41. Id. at 1. 
42. Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (prohibiting travel or 
transportation in commerce in aid of racketeering enterprises). 
43. See Herbert J. Miller, Jr., The "Travel Act"; A New Statutory Approach to 
Organized Crime in the United States, 181 DUQ. L. REv. 181,190 (1963) (discussing the 
effect of removing "transportation" from the text of the bill). 
44. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1002(a), 98 
Stat. 2136. When added, 18 U.S.C. § 1952A read as follows: 
(a) Whoever travels in 	or causes another (including the intended victim) to 
travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes another (includ­
ing the intended victim) to use the mail or any facility in interstate or 
foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in violation of 
the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt 
of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of 
pecuniary value, shall be fined . . . . 
(b) As used in this section and section 1952B 
(1) "anything of pecuniary value" means anything of value in the form of 
money, a negotiable instrument, a commercial interest, or anything 
else the primary significance of which is economic advantage; and 
(2) "facility of interstate commerce" includes means of transportation and 
communication. 
Id. 
45. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 304 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484. 
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trigger jurisdiction, mirrored the language used in the original ver­
sion of the Travel Act, § 1952.46 
In drafting § 1952A, Congress included a subsection to define 
terms used in the text of the entire statute. This subsection defined 
"facility of interstate commerce" as including "means of transporta­
tion and communication. "47 The phrase "facility of interstate com­
merce," however, does not otherwise appear in the text of the 
statute; § 1952A(a) uses the phrase "facility in interstate com­
merce." In subsequent years, Congress made several amendments 
to the murder-for-hire statute, though the apparent discrepancy be­
tween "facility in interstate commerce" and "facility of interstate 
commerce" has remained.48 
In 1988, Congress re-designated 18 U.S.c. § 1952A as 18 
U.S.C. § 1958.49 Congress again amended § 1958 in 1990,50 though 
these amendments focused entirely on § 1958(b), the most substan­
tive of which was including a new paragraph defining "State" as 
including "a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United 
States."51 In 1994, Congress enacted several amendments to 
§ 1958, primarily to increase: the maximum penalty to be imposed 
for violation of the statute, including a provision fot the death pen­
alty should death result from the murder-for-hire.52 Congress made 
two additional amendments in 1996 to fix minor errors in the con­
struction53 and prior amendment54 of § 1958. 
46. See id. 
47. See 18 U.S.c. § 1952A(b)(2). 
48. See infra Part II for a discussion of the varying judicial interpretations of the 
murder-for-hire statute. 
49. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7053(a), 102 Stat. 4181 
4402. Congress also amended § 1958 during this congressional session by increasing the 
maximum period of imprisonment from "5 years" to "10 years" where injury results 
from violation of the statute. Id. § 7058(b), at 4403. 
50. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1205(k), 104 Stat. 4789, 
4831. 
51. Id. 
52. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, §§ 60oo03(a)(ii), 140oo7(b), 320105, 330016(1)(L), (N), (Q), 108 Stat. 1796, 
1969, 2033, 2111, 2147-48. Congress also mistakenly amended § 1958 by inserting "or 
who conspires to do so" before "shall be fined" a second time. See id. § 320105, at 2111; 
cf id. § 140oo7(b), at 2033. Congress repealed this error in 1996. Economic Espionage 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 601(g)(3), 110 Stat. 3488, 3500. 
53. Congress noticed a misused connector in § 1958(a) and replaced "this title 
and imprisoned" with "this title or imprisoned." Pub. L. 104-294, § 605(a), Oct. 11, 
1996, 110 Stat. 3509. 
54. See id. § 601(g)(3), at 3500. 
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B. 	 Judicial Opinions Interpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of 
§ 1958 Prior to United States v. Weathers 
The courts offer relatively little analysis of the interstate juris­
dictional requirement of § 1958 in the context of wholly intrastate 
activity. In fact, prior to United States v. Weathers ,55 only two opin­
ions considered the jurisdictional reach of the murder-for-hire stat­
ute. Both of these opinions were issued by the Southern District of 
New York and reached conflicting results where the defendant used 
a paging system with interstate paging capabilities to facilitate di­
rect intrastate communication between the parties to a murder-for­
hire scheme. A discussion of these two cases follows. 
1. 	 United States v. Stevens 
In the first case, United States v. Stevens,56 defendant Stevens 
arranged a murder-for-hire in New York State and used an elec­
tronic pager to facilitate communication with his "hit-man."57 
When the "hit-man" called Stevens' pager, the paging system sent a 
signal to a transmitting station in New Jersey, which, in turn, sent a 
search signal across New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. This 
search signal was sent interstate regardless of the location of either 
party.58 During the course of arranging the murder-for-hire, Ste­
vens and the "hit-man" were at all times within New York. Federal 
authorities subsequently indicted Stevens under § 1958 for using a 
facility in interstate commerce, his pager, in the commission of a 
murder-for-hire.59 
The district court addressed whether this intrastate use of a 
paging system satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of § 1958 
where the signal used to search for Stevens' pager went interstate. 
The court read § 1958 to require that the "facility" be used in inter­
state commerce, such as an interstate transaction, to trigger federal 
jurisdiction under § 1958.60 Under the court's interpretation, Ste­
vens' use of the paging system satisfied this jurisdictional require­
55. 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 1999). See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes for 
a discussion of the Weathers court's analysis of § 1958. 
56. 	 842 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). ' 
57. Id. at 97. Oliver Kellman, alleged to be an intermediary between Stevens and 
the supposed hit man, actually leased the paging service used by Stevens. Id. All three 
parties were within the State of New York while arranging the murder for hire. Id. 
58. 	 Id. at 98. 
59. 	 Id. at 97. 
60. See id. This district court judge made no note of the apparent conflict be­
tween §§ 1958(a) and (b). The statute was apparently interpreted only from the sub­
stantive clause in § 1958(a). See id. 
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ment because the pager sent a signal interstate each time Stevens 
used it to contact the parties to the murder-for-hire, regardless of 
the location of the parties at the time of the communication.61 That 
"the paging systems very purpose [was] to reach across state lines to 
find people"62 further supported the district court's conclusion.63 
2. United States v. Paredes 
Two years later, in United States v. Paredes,64 another judge 
from the Southern District of New York took a different approach 
to the jurisdictional reach of § 1958. Defendant Parades also used a 
paging system to facilitate intrastate contact with an alleged "hit 
man" in the process of arranging a murder-for-hire.65 As in Ste­
vens, Paredes' paging system also sent an interstate search signal 
each time an incoming call activated it.66 
As in Stevens, the Paredes court made a threshold interpreta­
tion of § 1958 as requiring that the use of the facility under the par­
ticular facts of the murder-for-hire involve activity that crossed 
state lines.67 Unlike the Stevens court, however, the Paredes court 
found the phrase "use ... any facility in interstate commerce" am­
biguous, noting two cognizable interpretations,. "one stressing use 
and the other stressing facility."68 The court considered it irrele­
vant that Paredes' pager sent an interstate search signal when trig­
gered.69 Instead, the court focused on the location of the 
61. Id. at 98. 
62. Id. at 97. 
63. Id. In this respect, the district court's holding is limited in application to the 
use of paging systems that send signals across state lines. See id. at 98. 
64. 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
65. Id. at 585. 
66. Id. at 590. 
67. See id. at 585; cf supra note 57 and accompanying text. As in Stevens, the 
court made no note of the apparent language conflict in § 1958. Id. In its initial inter­
pretation of the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958, the court stated that "the term 
'facility in interstate commerce' includes 'means of transportation and communica­
tion.'" Id. The court supported this interpretation with a citation to § 1958(b). Id. 
Section 1958(b), however, reads '''facility of interstate commerce' includes means of 
transportation and communication." 18 U.S.c. § 1958(b)(2). Therefore, the Paredes 
court either mistakenly read § 1958(b) as using the term "facility in interstate com­
merce," or made an unsupported determination that § 1958 as a whole defines "facility 
in interstate commerce," and, therefore, that the terms "facility in interstate commerce" 
and "facility of interstate commerce" are equivalent. See Paredes, 950 F. Supp at 584. 
It is also possible that the court simply ignored the discrepancy in terms. 
68. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. at 587 (concluding that "it is the 'use' that must be 'in 
interstate commerce,' not the 'facility"'). 
69. See id. at 588-90. 
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communicating parties while they arranged the murder-for-hire.70 
The court, therefore, found that defendant's intrastate use of his 
paging system did not satisfy § 1958's jurisdictional requirement.71 
The court further reasoned that an interpretation of § 1958 that fo­
cused on the type of the facility used, rather than the manner in 
which it was used, would allow "federal jurisdiction to expand in 
lock-step with communication technology,"72 noting that Congress 
expressed its intent to avoid such a result.73 
The Southern District of New York presented two conflicting 
interpretations of § 1958 with its holdings in Stevens and Paredes. 
Although both opinions read § 1958 to require that the defendant's 
particular use of a facility be interstate in nature in order to trigger 
federal jurisdiction, they disagreed on the degree of interstate activ­
ity required. One interpretation required that the actual communi­
cation between the parties be across state lines,74 while the other 
simply required that the use of the facility initiate activity that 
crossed state lines, regardless of the location of the parties.75 It is 
also worth noting that in each case the court appeared to overlook 
the apparent conflict between the statutory language of §§ 1958(a) 
and (b). These cases provide a backdrop for a discussion of two 
recent opinions from the federal courts of appeals, each offering its 
own interpretation of § 1958. 
II. WEATHERS AND MAREK". CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 

THE JURISDICTIONAL REACH OF 18 U.S.c. § 1958 

The courts of appeals currently present two conflicting analy­
ses of the jurisdictional reach of § 1958. In United States v. 
Weathers,16 the Sixth Circuit found that conduct crossing state lines 
was a prerequisite for federal jurisdiction under § 1958. In contrast, 
in United States v. Marek,17 the Fifth Circuit read the statute more 
broadly and found that wholly intrastate use of a facility of inter­
state commerce satisfied § 1958. 
70. See id. at 589. 
71. [d. at 590. 
72. [d. at 588. The court further noted that such an interpretation would "trans­
form virtually all murder-for-hire schemes that involve electronic forms of communica­
tion into federal crimes." [d. 
73. See id. at 587 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 305 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484). 
74. [d. at 584. 
75. United States v. Stevens, 842 F. Supp. 96, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
76. 169 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999). 
77. 198 F.3d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1999), affd en bane, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001). 
109 2002] THE NATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A LOCAL KILLING 
A. United States v. Weathers 
In October of 1996, Jeffrey Eugene Weathers called Dan Peter­
son on his cell phone and asked him to kill Sergeant Dale Vitti toe 
of the Audubon Park Police Department.78 Weathers offered to 
pay Peterson $2500 and two ounces of cocaine to kill Vitti toe; 
Weathers would also provide the shotgun.79 
Sergeant Vittitoe had recently arrested Weathers for several 
state criminal offences, including trafficking in cocaine, possession 
of cocaine, possession of a stolen firearm, two counts of carrying a 
concealed weapon, possession of drug paraphernalia, reckless driv­
ing, and speeding.80 Weathers thought killing Sergeant Vittitoe was 
his best chance at avoiding jail time.81 
Over the course of the arrangements for this hired murder, 
Weathers and Peterson, who was working undercover for Kentucky 
State Police, remained at all times within Kentucky. During their 
final meeting, in a local hotel room, Weathers provided the murder 
weapon and the two discussed final payment arrangements. At the 
consummation of this meeting, the Kentucky State Police arrested 
Weathers and seized several weapons, his cell phone, and his pager. 
The authorities then charged Weathers under § 1958 for using a fa­
cility in interstate commerce, his cell phone, to arrange a murder­
for-hire.82 
The service for Weathers' cell phone covered the Louisville 
metropolitan area, including parts of southern Indiana.83 When 
Detective Peterson placed a call to Weathers' cell number, cell tow­
ers located throughout Kentucky and Indiana sent a signal to search 
for Weathers' cell phone.84 The final telephone connection be­
tween the parties was wholly intrastate,85 as Weathers and detective 
Peterson never left Kentucky, though the telephone connection be­
tween them relied on the use of an interstate cellular network.86 
In determining whether Weathers' use of his cell phone satis­
fied the interstate nexus requirement of § 1958, the district court 





83. Id. at 339. 
84. Id. An expert witness at trial explained that cell phones constantly emit a 
signal, which is comprised of the telephone number and an electronic serial number to 
identify that particular cellular phone. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. 
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initially noted the discrepancy between the terms "facility in inter­
state commerce" and "facility:of interstate commerce" and the dif­
ferent interpretations that could follow eachP "One stresses how 
the facility is used under the particular facts, and the other stresses 
whether the facility itself is a facility of interstate commerce."88 
Yet, after acknowledging this distinction, the district court synthe­
sized the two terms into one definition,89 applying to one category 
of activity.90 
This "hybrid" created by the district court focused on the man­
ner in which the defendant used the particular facility, rather than 
the nature of the facility used.91 Because the connection between 
Weathers and Detective Peterson .relied. on a search signal that 
made electronic contact with cell towers located in southern Indi­
ana, the court found that Weathers used the facility in an interstate 
manner.92 This led the district court to determine that Bell South 
Mobility93 acted as an "interstate communication facility,"94 and 
the use of this facility qualified as an "interstate communication" 
when searching for Weathers' cell phone.95 The district court ulti­
mately determined that Weathers' use of his cell phone to contract 
the murder of Sergeant Vitti toe was a "communication facility us­
age that was interstate,"96 and, therefore, came within the jurisdic­
tional reach of § 1958. 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's hold­
ing,97 though it rejected the court's reasoning.98 The Sixth Circuit 
87. Id. at 340 (emphasis added). The district court's opinion is unpublished. All 
references to the lower court's decision are taken from the text of the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (noting this discrep­
ancy in the text of § 1958). 
88. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 340. 
89. Id. Addressing this issue for the first time, the district court judge relied on 
the approaches taken in two conflicting district court opinions from the Southern Dis­
trict of New York to formulate its interpretation of § 1958. See supra Parts LB.1 and 
B.2 for a discussion of United States v. Stevens and United States v. Paredes. 
90. See Weathers, 169 F.3d at 341. 
91. Id. "I think that the question that we are presented with is how is the commu­
nication facility used under these particular circumstances not with respect to where the 
call was completed but how the facility itself was used." Id. at 340. 
92. Id. at 341. 
93. Bell South Mobility was the cell phone service provider used by Weathers. 
Id. at 339. 
94. Id. at 341. 

95; See id. 

96. Id. 
97. Id. at 344. 
98. Id. at 341. 
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saw a critical distinction between "in" and "of" interstate com­
merce,99 and, therefore, found that the merger of these terms into 
one definition was an unacceptable interpretation of § 1958.100 The 
Sixth Circuit determined that the terms "facility in interstate com­
merce" and "facility of interstate commerce" encompass different 
categories of activity, both of which Congress intended to 
regulate.101 
Having rejected the district court's approach to the problem 
presented by the differing subsections of § 1958, the Sixth Circuit 
reached the same conclusion as the district court by looking at the 
plain language of .§ 1958.102 The Weathers court determined that 
subsection § 1958(a) controls over § 1958(b) because it contains the 
"key prohibition creating the criminal offense. "103 The court dis­
pensed with the use of the term "facility of interstate commerce" in 
§ 1958(b)(2) as "merely [a definition of] an otherwise nonexistent 
term."l04 
Focusing on § 1958(a), the Weathers court concluded that the 
defendant must have used a "facility in interstate commerce" in at­
tempting to hire the killing of Sergeant Vittitoe,105 and found that 
this provision of § 1958 would be satisfied if Weathers' use of a fa­
cility caused activity that crossed state lines. After reaching this 
conclusion on the jurisdictional reach of § 1958, the Sixth Circuit's 
.99. Id. The Sixth Circuit relied on previous opinions that had found distinctions 
between these terms when used in different statutes. See, e.g., Aquionics Acceptance 
Corp: v. Kollar, 503 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1974) (distinguishing between "in" and 
"of' interstate commerce in an interpretation of the Securities and Exchange Act). 
100. See Weathers, 169 F.3d at 341. ' 
101. Id. at 341. The Sixth Circuit supported this position with reasoning used by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In Lopez, the Court 
identified three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce 
Clause: the use of the channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of inter­
state commerce; and activities that "substantially affect interstate commerce." See id. 
at 558-59. The Sixth Circuit used this reasoning to interpret "facility in interstate com­
merce," as used in § 1958, as Congress' attempt to regulate the use of the channels of 
interstate commerce, and "facility of interstate commerce" as Congress' attempt to reg­
ulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.' Weathers, 169 F.3d at 342. For a 
discussion of the implications of Lopez in the context of what the author calls "non­
subject matter specific criminal statutes," such as the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.c. 
§ 1341 (1994), the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.c. 
§ 1951 (1994), the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994), and the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.c. §§ 1962-1968 (1994), see St. Laurent, supra 
note 4. 
102. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 343. 
103. Id. at 342. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
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analysis followed the analysis of the district court. It determined 
that the call to Weathers' cell 'phone could not have taken place 
without the interstate search, and, therefore, that· Weathers used 
"an instrumentality in interstate commerce."106 
B. United States v. Marek 
In Marek,107 the Fifth Circuit faced the same issue when Betty 
Louise Marek attempted to contract the killing, of Betty Hooten 
Wade for interfering in Marek's romantic relationship with Arnold 
Blake.lo8 Marek mistakenly confided her desires in Ricardo 
Cervantes, who reported directly to the local sheriff, and in turn, 
agreed to work with the Texas Rangers and the FBI in appre­
hending Marek.109 Ce~vantes, under the direction of the FBI, re­
ferred Marek to 'Jose Cerrano, an FBI agent who would work 
undercover as the "hit man."110 Marek and Cerrano arranged the 
murder over the course of ten telephone conversations, which were 
recorded by the FBJ.111 Although Marek refused to meet Cerrano 
in person, she did agree to wire him $500 by Western Union for 
murdering Wade.u2 Both parties were in Texas when Marek trans­
ferred thefunds.113 Upon delivery of these funds,the FBI indicted 
Marek under § 1958 for using a facility in interstate commerce, 
Western Union, to facilitate. a murder-for-hire.1l4 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed1l5 the lower court's con­
viction.116 In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit did not find 
the conflict between § 1958(a) ("facility in interstate commerce") 
106. Id. 
107. 198 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1999), affd en bane, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001). 







115. Id. at 538. Marek pleaded guilty to the § 1958 indictment as part of a plea 
bargain. However, after sentencing, Marek filed a timely appeal of the judgment and 
the sentence imposed. Id. at 533. 
116. Id. at 533. In United States v. Cisneros, the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue 
in dicta, as that case involved telephone conversations between the United States and 
Mexico, which clearly satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958. United States 
v. Cisneros, 194 F.3d 626, 630-31, 634-35 (5th Cir. 1999) vacated by 203 F.3d 333 (5th 
Cir. 2000), affd en banc sub nom., United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001). The court in Marek, therefore, was not bound by 
Cisneros on this issue, and refuted the reasoning therein. Marek, 198 F.3d at 534. 
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and § 1958(b) ("facility of interstate commerce") that the Sixth Cir­
cuit found in Weathers.117 .Using the plain meaning of the statute, 
the Marek Court determined that the phrase "use ... any facility in 
interstate commerce"118 identified "functions of the kind of facility 
that must be used,"119 rather than specifying how the facility must 
be used in the relevant transaction pO In simpler terms, under the 
Fifth Circuit's interpretation, § 1958 required only the use of a facil­
ity that was of the type generally engaged in interstate commerce to 
bring the conduct under federal jurisdiction and did not hinge on 
the nature of the particular use while committing the murder-for­
hire.121 
In reaching this conclusio~, the court used a plain meaning 
construction of the phrase "use . . . any facility in interstate . . . 
commerce."122 The Fifth Circuit concluded that, since "the word 
'in' is more closely juxtaposed to 'facility' than it is to 'use,' ... 'in 
interstate commerce' [should be read to modify] 'facility,' not 
'use."'123 Therefore, under the Fifth Circuit's construction of 
§ 1958, it is the facility that must be "in interstate ... commerce," 
not the use.124 
'The Fifth Circuit supported this reading of § 1958 with an in­
terpretation of Congressional intenP25 The court noted that Con­
gress used the terms "facility in interstate commerce" and "facility 
of interstate commerce" interchangeably in its discussion of 
§ 1958.126 Thus, according to the Fifth Circuit, itfollowed that Con­
gress intended to equate these terms and "to criminalize any use of 
a 'facility of interstate commerce' in a murder-for-hire scheme."127 
117. Marek, 198 F.3d at 534-35; see United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342­
43 (6th Cir. 1999). See supra Part Il.A for a detailed discussion of the Weathers 
holding. 
118. 18 U.S.c. § 1958(a) (2000). 
119. Marek, 198 F.3d at 535. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000); Marek, 198 F.3d at 535. 
123. Marek, 198 F.3d at 535. The Marek court supported this reading of § 1958 
with the reasoning that if Congress had intended to regulate only transactions that 
crossed state lines, it could have easily constructed the statute to achieve this result. For 
example, Congress could have written: "whoever makes interstate use of a facility in 
interstate commerce" or "whoever makes use, in interstate commerce, of the mail or 
any other facility." [d. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.; see S. REp. No. 98-225, at 305-06 (1984), reprinted in 1984 u.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3484-85. 
127. Marek, 198 F.3d at 535. 
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The Weathers court's reading of § 1958 required that a portion 
of the statute be ignored because the court found subsections (a) 
and (b) to be in conflict.128 However, the Marek court found this 
reading unpersuasive because it found no inconsistency between 
the subsections.129 Further, such a reading ran contrary to the Su­
preme Court's stance on statutory construction, in particular that 
"[a] statute should be interpreted so as to give each provision signif­
icance."130 The court ruled that under its own interpretation of 
§ 1958, where "facility in interstate commerce" and "facility of in­
terstate commerce" are "interchangeable synonyms," § 1958(b) 
serves to clarify § 1958(a), and, therefore, gives every section of the 
statute meaning.!31 The Marek .courtpreferreQ this interpretation 
because it gave effect to "as much of the statute's language as possi­
ble," and would "moot[] the least language."132 The Marek court 
found that an interpretation of § 1958 that left out an entire section 
was suspect, and that it "strains credibility to assume that an entire 
subsection was placed in . the statute by accident or without 
purpose."133 . 
Weathers and Marek present two conflicting interpretations of 
§ 1958. The Weathers court found that activity that crossed state 
lines was a necessary prerequisite for federal jurisdiction under 
§ 1958.134 The court found this requirement had been met, how­
ever, not because the parties communicated across state lines, but 
because their intrastate communication relied on communication 
facilities that were across state linesp5 Presumably, the Weathers 
court would have held differently had Weathers used a traditional 
landline telephone as opposed to his cell phone. The Marek court, 
in .contrast, found that' wh,olly intrastate u~e of an interstate com­
128. United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999) 
129. Marek, 198 F.3d at 535 ("We find no ... conflict between the two provi­
sions."). The Marek court went on to criticize dicta in United States v. Cisneros, in 
which the court noted that the "narrower interpretation of the statute, which applies the 
substantive part of the statute in (a), appears to be the appropriate one to use." Id. at 
536 (quoting United States v. Cisneros, 194 F.3d 626, 635 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated by 203 
F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2000), affd en banc sub nom., United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 
(5th Cir. 2001)). 
130. Id. at 535, 536 (citing United Statesv. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30,36 
(1992)). 
131. Id. at 536. 
132. Id. ' 
133. Id. at 536-37. 
134. Weathers, 169 F.3dat 342. 
135. Id. at 339. 
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merce facility satisfied § 1958.136 
III. BALANCING POLICY AND ANOTHER LOOK AT THE PLAIN 

MEANING OF §18 U.S.c.§ 1958: "INTERSTATE" MEANS 





The federal murder-for-hire statute proscribes paying another 
to commit a murder for hire in two instances: when the perpetrator 
either (1) travels in or causes another to travel in interstate com­
merce, or (2) uses or causes another to use the mail or any facility 
in interstate commerce.137 The first instance requires simply .that 
the perpetrator cause the physical interstate movement of a person, 
and has given the courts little difficulty.138 The courts have exper­
ienced greater difficulty in interpreting the jurisdictional reach of 
§ 1958 in the second instance, however, which hinges on the mean­
ing of the phrase "uses or cause·s another to use the mail or any 
facility in interstate or foreign commerce." The apparent discrep­
ancy within the text of § 1958 further complicates the interpretation 
of § 1958's jurisdictional reach. 
Section 1958, therefore, allows two possible interpretations of 
the statute's jurisdictional reach, one significantly broader than the 
other. Under the broader interpretation, the statute would encom­
pass the use of a telephone139 or the maiP40 to communicate with a 
136. Marek, 198 F.3d at 538. 
137. See 18 U.S.c. § 1958(a) (2000). 
138. See Marek, 238 F.3d at 316. 
139. See United States v. Gilbert, 181 F.3d 152, 158 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that a 
telephone is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, the use of which is a sufficient 
basis for federal jurisdiction); United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that cellular" telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
and "[a]s such they fall under category two of Lopez, and no further inquiry is neces­
sary to determine that their regulation ... is within Commerce Clause authority"); 
Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 503 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that 
intrastate use of a telephone satisfied the· jurisdictional requirement of section lO(b) of 
the Securities and Exchange Act); see also Miller & Biggerstaff, supra note 5, at 679-86 
(discussing whether Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate purely intra­
state calls and faxes under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act). 
140. See United States v. Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
post office is a facility in interstate commerce); United States v. Photogrammetric, 103 
F. Supp. 2d 875, 882 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding that the amended version of the federal 
mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.c. § 1341, covers "purely intrastate delivery of mails by pri­
vate or commercial carriers as long as those carriers engage in interstate deliveries .... 
While jurisdiction lies only under the Commerce Clause for the use of private or com­
mercial carriers, Congress may still regulate their intrastate activities because they are 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce"), affd, 259 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. de­
nied, 122 S. Ct. 1295 (2002). 
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hired killer, the use of an automatic teller machine to withdraw pay­
ment,141 or an automobile to deliver the money,142 even where such 
use was entirely intrastate. Such a broad interpretation would 
make virtually every hired murder a·federal crime, as it is hard to 
imagine a murder-for-hire scheme that would not make use of one· 
of these facilities. 
A narrower interpretation of § 1958, however, limits federal ju­
risdiction to those situations where the defendant has caused inter­
state activity in the process of committing a murder-for-hire. 
Further, even within this general interpretation of § 1958, there is 
some disagreement over the degree of interaction with interstate 
commerce that is required to trigger the statute. 
A. 	 Reconciling the Differences Between § 1958(a) and 
§ 1958(b)(2) 
The discrepancy in terms within the text of § 1958 plays a sig­
nificant part in the disagreement in the courts over the jurisdic­
tional reach of the statute.143 In the statute's current form, 
§ 1958(a) uses the phrase "facility in interstate commerce" in its 
jurisdictional trigger, while § 1958(b), apparently there to define 
terms used in § 1958(a),144 defines the phrase "facility of interstate 
commerce." Further, "facility of interstate commerce" is enclosed 
in quotes in the text of § 1958(b )(2), suggesting that the section is 
defining that specific phrase and that the drafters intended to take 
it verbatim from § 1958(a).. Section 1958(b) also defines the terms 
"anything of pecuniary value," § 1958(b)(1), and "state," 
§ 1958(b)(3), both of which appear as quoted in the text of 
141. See United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 275-76 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
an interstate network of ATMs is a facility in interstate commerce, the unlawful use of 
which "falls squarely within the literal language of the Travel Act"). 
142. See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
a car is an instrumentality of interstate commerce); United States v. Cobb, 144 F.3d 319, 
322 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that automobiles qualify as instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce); United States v. Randolph, 93 F.3d 656, 660 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[C]ars are 
themselves 'instrumentalities' of interstate commerce."); United States v. Bishop, 66 
F.3d 569, 588 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Motor vehicles are 'the quintessential instrumentalities of 
modern interstate commerce.'''). 
143. Congress created this apparent discrepancy in 1984 when it enacted the mur­
der-for-hire statute by, first, adopting language from the Travel Act (specifically, the 
jurisdictional trigger, using the phrase "facility in interstate commerce") and, second, by 
adding a section to the statute defining the phrase "facility of interstate commerce." 
See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the evolution of the text of the murder-for-hire 
statute. 
144. Section 1958(b) defines terms for the purposes of both § 1958 and § 1959, 
but neither section uses the phrase "facility of interstate commerce." 
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§ 1958(a). This discrepancy has survived numerous statutory 
amendments, and remains in the text of the current murder-for-hire 
statute. As a result, some courts have found § 1958 ambiguous on 
its face,145 while others have found the ambiguity "more apparent 
than real. "146. 
The courts have traditionally given these phrases different 
meanings, which complicate an attempt to reconcile the apparently 
conflicting subsections of.§ 1958.147 Courts have interpreted use of 
a "facility of interstate commerce" to apply to any use of a facility 
where the facility itself is somehow interstate in nature, but have 
interpreted use of a "facility in interstate commerce" to apply only 
where the actual use of the facility ~s interstate in nature, regardless 
of the nature of the facility used.148 
There are a number of possibilities for this apparent discrep­
ancy, though they fall into two general, and perhaps obvious, cate­
gories: (1) that the discrepancy is the result of an overlooked 
drafting error by Congress, or (2) that Congress wished to clarify 
that the use of communication and transportation facilities could 
trigger the statute by defining the phrase "facility of interstate 
commerce," either to equate with "facility in interstate commerce," 
or to help define the types of facilities to which "facility in interstate 
commerce" would apply. 
Congress made many amendments to the murder-for-hire stat­
ute subsequent to enacting it. The fact that this apparent discrep­
ancy survived the amendments suggests that the statute's current 
form accurately reflects Congress' intentions. These amendments 
extend from substantive changes149 to the correction of errors in the 
statute's construction,150 many of which have been minute gram­
145. See United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342-43 (6th Cir. 1999); see also 
United States v. Cisneros, 203 F.3d 333, 341 (5th Cir. 2000), affd en bane sub nom., 
United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001). 
146. United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2001). 
147. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam) (DeMoss, J., concurring). 
148. See, e.g., id.; Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kollar, 503 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th 
Cir. 1974). 
149. For example, Congress increased the penalty for violations of the statute, 
including a provision for the death penalty, see supra notes 49, 52, and added "state" to 
the terms defined in § 1958(b). See supra Part LA.2. 
150. In particular, in 1996, Congress corrected a 1994 amendment, which mistak­
enly added, for a second time, the phrase "or who conspires to do so." See supra note 
52. During this same session, Congress also noticed and corrected a misused connector, 
replacing the phrase "this title and imprisoned" with "this title or imprisoned." See 
supra note 53. 
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matical corrections of the type that would be required to amend the 
apparent discrepancy between § 1958(a) and § 1958(b), if this con­
flict were the result of mistake. This suggests that Congress gave 
§ 1958 a degree of scrutiny that would have discovered such a mis­
take, were there a mistake to be discovered. The statute as it 
stands, with respect to the language relevant to this discussion, in all 
likelihood accurately reflects the intent of Congress.151 
If § 1958 in its current form is as Congress intended, then Con­
gress must also have either intended "facility of interstate com­
merce" to be synonymous with "facility in interstate commerce," or 
intended its definition of "facility of interstate commerce," to refine 
or explain the scope of the jurisdictional trigger used in § 1958(a), 
the use of a "facility in interstate commerce." Any other interpre­
tation renders § 1958(b )(2) meaningless, as it would "define[] an 
otherwise non-existent term,"152 and, as such, ignores the Supreme 
Court's consistent admonition to interpret statutory provisions in a 
way that gives meaning to the entire statute.153 
Further, the legislative history of § 1958 suggests that Congress 
intended § 1958(a) and § 1958(b)(2) to be read in conjunction with 
one another. Congress used the terms "facility in interstate com­
merce" and "facility of interstate commerce" interchangeably 
throughout the statute's legislative history.154 Congress also inter­
changeably used the phrase "use of interstate facilities."155 In addi­
tion, Congress specifically contemplated the use of communication 
and transportation facilities when (irafting the statute, and ex­
151. See supra Part I.A2 for a discussion of the amendments Congress made to 
18 U.S.c. § 1958. 
152. See United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 1999). 
153. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994) (stating that judges 
should hesitate to treat statutory terms a's surplusage in any setting, and "expressing 
'deep reluctance' to interpret statutory provisions 'so as to render superfluous other 
provisions in the same enactment'" (quoting Pa. Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 
495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990))); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) 
(stating that a statute should tie interpreted so that every word is given significance); 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (stating that it is an "elementary canon of 
construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inopera­
tive"); United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1959) ("It is our duty 'to give 
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute' ... rather than to emasculate an 
entire section." (citation omitted)). 
154. S. REp. No. 98-225, at 304-06 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.CCAN. 3182, 
3483-86. A federal investigation of a murder-for-hire should be available when the 
proper federal nexus exists, "such as ... use of the facilities of interstate commerce," id. 
at 305, and the murder-for-hire statute reaches "the use ... of a facility in interstate ... 
commerce," id. at 306. 
155. Id. at 305, reprinted in 1984 U.S.CCAN. 3182, 3484. 
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pressed its intention that the prohibition against the use of facilities 
in the commission of a murder-for-hire includes these specific types 
of facilities. 156 Congress, therefore, intended § 1958(2)(b) as a sub­
stantive addition to the scope of the statute, which further discour­
ages an interpretation of § 1958 that renders § 1958(b )(2) 
superfluous. The manner in which Congress used these terms in its 
discussion of § 1958 suggests that they have a related meaning in 
the context of the murder-for-hire statute. 
The proper reading of 18 U.S.c. § 1958 interprets the phrases 
"facility in interstate commerce" and "facility of interstate com­
merce" in conjunction, rather than in conflict, with one another.157 
The use of these terms throughout the statute's legislative history 
shows that Congress used these terms interchangeably and suggests 
that it intended them to apply to the same category of activity, at 
least within the context of the murder-for-hire statute. Further, this 
is the only reading that gives meaning to § 1958 in its entirety, 
thereby complying with established rules of statutory construction. 
B. Defining The Jurisdictional Reach of § 1958 
If § 1958(a) and (b) are to be read in conjunction with one an­
other and as applying to a single category of activity for the pur­
poses of § 1958, as discussed in the preceding section of this note, 
then the next inquiry must determine whether Congress intended to 
regulate any use of a "facility of interstate commerce," or whether 
it intended to regulate only the use of facilities where the actual use 
was interstate. An analysis of the text and legislative history of 
§ 1958 and a look at the Travel Act suggest that § 1958 should be 
read to extend only to use of facilities where the use is interstate in 
nature. This is the only interpretation of § 1958 that gives meaning 
to the entire text of the statute. Further, although Congress stated 
that the use of the facilities of interstate commerce could trigger 
federal jurisdiCtion, it did so only in the context of establishing that 
the use of such facilities could be equivalent to the actual interstate 
156. Id. at 305-06, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484-85; see, e.g., 107 
CONGo REc. 13,943 (1961) (including comments by Senator Eastland that "[o]ther inter­
state transportation facilities may be used by organized crime to carry out unlawful 
activity" and should be included within the purview of the Travel Act). See supra notes 
20-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of Congress' intention to include trans­
portation and communication facilities as jurisdictional triggers for the Travel Act. 
157. See United States V. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 324 (5th Cir. 2001) (Jolly, J., dis­
senting) (agreeing with the majority that § 1958(b) is not definitional in a sense that 
conflicts with § 1958(a), but, rather, merely provides examples of what might constitute 
a "facility" for purposes of § 1958(a». 
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travel by a person when such use was interstate in nature.158 Con­
gress never contemplated wholly intrastate activity.159 
1. Plain Meaning Construction of § 1958 
In any instance of statutory interpretation, the specific lan­
guage of the statute is the appropriate place to begin,160 and, "un­
less otherwise defined, words [carry] their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning."161 The text of § 1958, however, presents this 
traditional approach with an immediate challenge, as the statute 
uses two different phrases in a manner that suggests that they be 
used interchangeably.162 In addition, the courts have found a "criti­
cal" distinction between these two phrases.163 
A literal reading of the statute disregards the definition in 
§ 1958(b), as it defines a seemingly irrelevant term, and leaves only 
the substantive portion, § 1958(a).164 This approach, however, runs 
contrary the Supreme Court's admonition to give every statutory 
term significance.165 But, this cannon of construction is as difficult 
to apply, as it is to ignore. Using the more broad phrase contained 
in § 1958(b), "facility of interstate commerce," to define the scope 
of § 1958(a)'s use of "facilities in interstate commerce" would mean 
that any use of an interstate commerce facility would trigger § 1958 
under a construction of that phrase alone. This interpretation 
would render meaningless the provisions of § 1958(a) that address 
using the mail and using facilities in "foreign commerce." If the use 
158. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 304-06 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3483-86. 
159. Id. at 306-07, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485-86. 
160. See United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356 (1994); Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).• 
161. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (citing Burns v. Alcala, 420 
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975)). 
162. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of, and attempt to reconcile, the appar­
ent discrepancy between the phrases "facility in interstate commerce" and "facility of 
interstate commerce" within the text of § 1958. 
163. United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1999); see United 
States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (DeMoss, J., concurring) 
(distinguishing between "in" and "of' interstate commerce); United States v. Barry, 888 
F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that "a statute that speaks in terms of an instru­
mentality in interstate commerce rather than an instrumentality of interstate commerce 
is intended to apply to interstate activities only"); Aquionics Acceptance Corp. v. Kol­
lar, 503 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1974) (making the same distinction where Congress 
used these terms in a different statute). 
164. See Weathers, 169 F.3d at 342 (concluding that there is an irresolvable dis­
. crepancy between 	§ 1958(a) and (b), and that § 1958(a) controls over § 1958(b), as 
§ 1958(a) contains the language setting out the criminal offense). 
165. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992). 
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of any "facility of interstate commerce" triggered the statute, then 
there would be no need to mention the use of the mail or the use of 
facilities in foreign commerce, as each of these activities would be 
covered within the use of a "facility of interstate commerce."166 
In United States v. Marek,167 in an attempt to reconcile the ap­
parent conflict between § 1958(a) and § 1958(b), the court found 
that "in interstate or foreign commerce" was "an adjective phrase 
that inodifies 'facility,' the noun that immediately precedes it-not 
an adverbial phrase that modifies the syntactically more remote 
verb '[to] use."'168 The Marek court concluded that the use of a 
"facility in interstate commerce" was synonymous with the use of 
an "interstate commerce facility," and, therefore, that any use of 
such a facility triggered the jurisdictional element of § 1958, regard­
less of whether the particular use was intrastate or interstate.169 
The Marek court's interpretation of § 1958, though convenient, 
does not resolve the problems associated with a plain meaning ap­
proach to § 1958; it also makes superfluous express provisions of 
the statute. Just two paragraphs after its interpretation of § 1958, 
the, Marek court states: 
[T]he u.s. Post Office is a facility in interstate commerce, ... 

[and that] whenever a person uses the United States Post Of­

fice ... to deliver parcels, money, or other material by means of 

the mail, that person clearly and unmistakably has used a "facil­
. ity in interstate commerce," irrespective of the intrastate destina­

tion of the item mailed.170 
The Marek court's plain meaning construction of § 1958(a), 
therefore, renders superfluous the use of "the mail" as a jurisdic­
tional trigger of § 1958, as the use of a "facility in interstate com­
merce," under the Marek court's construction, would encompass 
any use of the mail. l71 
166. See supra notes 139-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types 
of facilities that constitute "facilities of interstate commerce." 
167. 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001). 
168. Id. at 316. 
169. Id. at 321. 
170. /d. at 317 (quoting United States v. Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 
1994». 
171. See S. REp. No. 98-225, at 305-06 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3484-85 (referring to the authority that use of the mail constitutes the use of a 
facility of interstate commerce). 
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2. 	 The Federalism Implications of Defining the Scope of 
§ 1958 
Further supporting a narrow construction of § 1958, the Su­
preme Court has indicated that federalism concerns could affect 
statutory interpretation. l72 In Wickard v . .Filburn,173 the Court 
stated "[t]hat an activity is of local character may help in a doubtful 
case to determine whether Congress intended to reach it."174 The 
Wickard Court, however, did not indicate what would constitute a 
"doubtful case," though the Court applied this concept in a later 
opinion, United States v. Bass.175 
In Bass, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction for a fire­
arms possession in violation of the Omnibus Crime Control. and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968, which made it a federal crime for any con­
victed felon who "receives, possesses, or transports [ a firearm] in 
interstate commerce or affecting commerce."176 Rejecting the pros­
ecution's argument that possession was punishable without showing 
a connection to commerce, the Court stated: "Because its sanctions 
are criminal and because, under the Government's broader reading, 
the statute would mark a major inroad into a domain traditionally 
left to the States, we refuse to adopt a broad reading in the absence 
of a clearer direction from Congress."177 In further explaining its 
refusal to adopt the prosecution's argument, the Court reasoned 
that "[u]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be 
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance. "178 
Interpreting the murder-for-hire statute implicates these same 
concerns. Under a broad reading of § 1958, a hired murder be­
comes a federal crime simply through the Use of a facility of inter­
state commerce. Murder· has traditionally been a matter of local 
concern.179 In enacting § 1958, Congress gave no indication that it 
172. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); see also John O. McGin­
nis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Dis­
covery, 90 CAL. L. REv. 485, 511-26 (2002) (discussing the rise of federalism principles 
in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence and discussing the Court's recent decision in 
Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), as an affirmation and expansion of the 
principles established by the Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995». 
173. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
174. Id. at 124. 
175. 404 U.S. 336 (1971). 
176. Id. at 348. 
177. [d. at 339 
178. Id. at 349. 
179. See S. REp. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484; 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization ofAmerican Criminal Law, 
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intended to infringe on the jurisdiction of local authorities. To the 
contrary, Congress expressed sensitivity to the possibility, sug­
gesting that the murder-for-hire statute should be enforced in a 
manner that avoided this effect.18o 
Considering the potential that a murder-for-hire scheme could 
be inherently local, even where it involves some minimal use of in­
terstate commerce facilities, a general rule granting jurisdiction 
broadly under § 1958 goes against the concerns the Supreme Court 
expressed in Wickard and Bass. A narrow reading, however, which 
would look at the nature of the particular use of interstate com­
merce facilities, would honor these concerns by giving federal juris­
diction only to those hired murders that actively engage interstate 
commerce and avoid upsetting the "federal-state balance."181 
3. Interpreting § 1958 in its Statutory Context 
a. Legislative History of the Murder-For-Hire Statute 
When Congress first introduced the murder-for-hire statute, it 
generally implied that, though conscious of potential infringement 
on traditional areas of state law, it intended federal authorities to 
have some prosecutorial discretion under the statute.182 At the 
same time, Congress warned the Justice Department to exercise dis­
46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1137-42 (1995) (discussing briefly the original principles behind 
federalism and the evolution of federal criminal law). 
180. See S. REp. No. 98-225, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3484. 
181. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of increas­
ing trend toward federalization of crime, see generally Brickey, supra note 179 (discuss­
ing the problems associated with reconciling the expansion of federal criminal law and 
the enlarging of the national police power with principles of federalism); Sara Sun 
Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles To Define the Proper Limits for 
Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995) (arguing that the number of 
federal criminal prosecutions should be reduced to return the balance between the state 
and federal governments and to safeguard the functioning of the federal courts); Rich­
ard A Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387 (1987) 
(critiquing the modern expansion of the commerce power). See also Laura Ann Forbes, 
Comment, A More Convenient Crime: Why States Must Regulate Internet-Related Crimi­
nal Activity Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 20 PACE L. REv. 189 (1999) (argu­
ing, in part, that if the federal courts claim jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause 
over internet crimes, there will be a significant reduction in the prosecutorial ability of 
the states and a weakening of their police power). But see Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, 
The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 247 (1997) (arguing 
that concerns that crime is becoming overly federalized are unfounded and generally 
misdirected, and that constitutional and policy considerations suggest the opposite con­
clusion, that the federal government can and should exercise more authority, particu­
larly with respect to street crime). 
182. See S. REp. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.CCAN. 3182, 3484. 
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cretion in asserting jurisdiction and to work closely with local 
authorities. 
[T]he Committee is aware of the concerns of local prosecutors 
with respect to the creation of concurrent Federal jurisdiction in 
an area, namely murder cases, which has heretofore been the al­
most exclusive responsibility of State and local authorities. How­
ever, the Committee believes that the option of Federal 
investigation and prosecution should be available when a murder 
is committed or planned as consideration for something of pecu­
niary value and the proper Federal nexus, such as interstate 
travel, use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or use of the 
mails, is present.183 
Congress also set forth criteria to determine when jurisdiction 
should be asserted, giving the Justice Department guidance in exer­
cising its authority under the statute: 
Federal Jurisdiction should be asserted selectively based on such 
factors as the type of defendants reasonably believed to be in­
volved and the relative ability of the Federal and State authori­
ties to investigate and prosecute. For example, the apparent 
involvement of organized crime figures or the lack of effective 
local investigation because of the interstate features of the crime 
could indicate that Federal action was appropriate.184 
Although this language appears at times to evidence an intent 
to grant jurisdiction broadly, Congress' seemingly indiscriminate 
use of the terms "facility of interstate commerce" and "facility in 
interstate commerce" in describing the scope of the murder-for-hire 
statute suggests that it may not have intended these phrases to have 
any specific or determinative effect on the jurisdictional reach of 
the statute.185 
In its more substantive discussions of the reach of the statute, 
Congress gave some indication that it anticipated activity that 
crossed state lines when articulating the scope of the statute. In 
discussing the addition of § 1958(b)(2),186 the provision of the mur­
der-for-hire statute that expressly expands the reach of the statute 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. See id. at 3484-85. 
186. Section 1958(b )(2) defines "facility of interstate commerce" as including 
"means of transportation and communication." See supra notes 47-48 and accompany­
ing text. At the time it was introduced, the murder-for-hire statute was a supplement to 
the Travel Act, § 1952A, but was subsequently designated § 1958. For convenience, I 
am using the designation § 1958. 
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to include transportation and communication facilities, Congress 
stated that "an interstate telephone call is sufficient to trigger Fed­
eral jurisdiction, as it did" under the Travel Act.187 It gave no indi­
cation that an intrastate call would be sufficient. Congress' 
statements in this context suggest that, with the addition of 
§ 1958(b )(2), it only intended to make clear that the proper inter­
state nexus could be achieved through the use of a telephone, not 
that the use of a telephone itself was sufficient grounds for jurisdic­
tion under § 1958.188 
Furthermore, Congress stated that, with respect to the use of 
communication facilities, it intended "that the full breadth of the 
. phrase 'any facility in interstate or foreign commerce' as used in the 
[Travel Act] also be applicable" to the murder-for-hire statute.189 
In support, and as an example of the "full breadth" of "any facility 
in interstate ... commerce" as that phrase appeared in both the 
Travel Act and the murder-for-hire statute, Congress cited a court 
of appeals case, United States v. Villano.1 90 Villano involved a 
Travel Act indictment for using an interstate commerce facility, a 
telephone, to further an illegal gambling activity. The defendant in 
Villano, however, used this telephone to call across state lines, and 
the authorities based his indictment under the Travel Act on this 
interstate use.191 
Although the legislative history of the murder-for-hire statute 
suggests that Congress granted jurisdiction and some degree of 
prosecutorial discretion to the justice department, in so doing, Con­
gress did not indicate that wholly intrastate activity is sufficient to 
trigger the statute. In addition, Congress indiscriminately used the 
phrases "facility in" and "facility of" interstate commerce sug­
. gesting that it did not intend these phrases to have a determinative 
effect on the scope of the statute. To the contrary, Congress' sub­
stantive discussions of the scope of the statute indicate that the stat­
ute only regulates interstate activity. 
187. See S. REp. No. 98-225, reprinted in 1984 u.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485. 
188. See id. 
189. See id. at 3485 n.5. 
190. 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1976); seeS. REp. No. 98-225, reprinted at 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3485 n.5 (citing United States v. Villano to illustrate its statement 
that it intended an interstate telephone call to be sufficient grounds for federal jurisdic­
tion under the murder-for-hire statute as it would under the Travel Act). 
191. See Villano, 529 F.2d at 1050-51. 
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b. Contemporary Interpretations of the Travel Act 
The federal murder-for-hire statute directly descends from the 
Travel Act, initially comprising a supplement to that Act. l92 Con­
sidering the murder-for-hire statute's history, the courts have found 
it appropriate to interpret the statute in light of the Travel Act.193 
Of particular interest is a 1990 Congressional amendment to 
the Travel Act,194 which appears to be a response by Congress to a 
1989 decision by the Sixth Circuit, United States v. Barry,195 holding 
that the Travel Act applied only to interstate mailings.196 In reach­
ing this conclusion, the Barry court first determined that the juris­
dictional requirement of § 1952, to "use[] any facility in interstate 
or foreign commerce," expressed Congress' intent to regulate only 
interstate activity, and did not apply to wholly intrastate activi­
ties.197 Examining the rest of § 1952's language, the court deter­
mined that Congress gave no indication that it intended the mail to 
be treated differently than other facilities, and, therefore, con­
cluded that § 1952 applied only to interstate mailings.198 .The court 
went on to mention that if Congress had intended § 1952 to cover 
not only interstate travel and interstate use of other facilities, but all 
uses of the mail, the logical wor9ing would have been "use of facili­
192. See United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) 
(interpreting 18 U.S.c. § 1952A, the murder-for-hire statute in its original form as a 
supplement to the Travel Act). See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the evolution of 
the murder-for-hire statute from the Travel Act. 
193. See Edelman, 873 F.2d at 794 ("[I]t is appropriate tei review [a federal mur­
der-for-hire conviction] in light of ... interpretations of the Travel Act."); accord 
United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2(01) (allowing jurisdiction based on 
intrastate use of interstate facilities for other statutes similar to § 1958), affd en bane, 
238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), cert denied, 122 S. Ct. 37 (2001); United States v. Weathers, 
169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1998) (interpreting the murder-for-hire statute as a subset of 
the Travel Act). 
194. Clarification ofApplicability of18 U.S.c. 1952 to All Mailings in Furtherance 
of Unlawful Activity, Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1604, 104 Stat. 
4789,4843. 
195. 888 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1989). 
196. Id. at 1096. When the Sixth Circuit decided Barry, § 1952 read in relevant 
part: "Whoever travels in interstate [or] foreign commerce or uses any facility in inter­
state or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to [engage in unlawful activ­
ity] ... shall be fined ...." Id. at 1092; cf United States v. Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 254 
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that, applying § 1952 before the 1990 amendment, any use of 
the mail is an use of an interstate facility even if the mailings themselves were intrastate 
only). 
197. Barry, 888 F.2d at 1095. 
198. Id. at 1096. 
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ties in interstate commerce or the mail."199 
Congress appears to have taken up the Barry court's sugges­
tion. During its 1990 session, just one year after the Barry decision, 
Congress amended the wording of § 1952 so that it applied to "who­
ever uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce," 
in order to clarify applying'§ 1952 to mailings for unlawful activi­
ties.2OO Congress did not "clarify the applicability" of § 1952 to the 
use of all facilities, but only to all use of the mail. Given that, under 
the Barry court's construction, § 1952 applied only to interstate use 
of facilities and interstate use of the mail and Congress chose to 
clarify § 1952 only with respect to the mail, it seems a reasonable 
inference that the Barry court correctly interpreted Congress' in­
tent to have § 1952 apply only to the interstate use of facilities other­
than the mail. 
Congress could have left § 1952 in its pre-1990 form and still 
issued its clarifying amendment. Congress made this amendment, 
however, to ensure that § 1952 applied to all uses of the mail,201 
while appearing to leave intact, and even condone, the Barry 
court's interpretation of § 1952 as applying only to the interstate 
use of facilities other than the mail. The Supreme Court has stated 
that statutory provisions should be interpreted consistently with 
subsequent statutory amendments.202 In light of Congress' 1990 
amendment, it seems most plausible to interpret the jurisdictional 
reach of the phrase "uses any facility in interstate ... commerce," 
within the context of the Travel Act, as being limited to the inter­
state use of facilities. 
If the jurisdictional reach of the Travel Act is limited to the 
interstate use of facilities, then § 1958 might best be interpreted as 
having this same reach. Congress originally drafted § 1958 as a sup­
plement to the Travel Act, and the two statutes contain identical 
language with respect to their jurisdictional triggers. Further, the 
courts have relied on Travel Act interpretations to shed light on the 
scope of § 1958.203 
199. Id. at 1096; cf supra note 196 (quoting the language of § 1952 at the time of 
the Barry decision). 
200. See Clarification ofApplicability of18 U.S.c. 1952 to All Mailings in Further­
ance of Unlawful Activity, Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1604, 104 
Stat. 4789,4843. Interestingly, with this change, Congress changed § 1952 to mirror the 
exact language of § 1958. See 18 U.S.c. § 1958 (2000). 
201. See Crime Control Act of 1990 § 1604. 
202. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 149-52 (1987). 
203. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text. 
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c. Legislative History of The Travel Act 
At the inception of the Travel Act, Congress seemed to work 
from the assumption that the statute they were creating would ap­
ply to activity that crossed state lines.204 In proposing the bill, The 
Attorney General stated that he intended it "to take effective ac­
tion against the racketeer who conducts ail unlawful business, but 
lives far from the scene in comfort and safety ...."205 The Attor­
ney General was addressing criminal activity that crossed state 
boundaries.206 Congress, however, did not expressly limit the legis­
lation to interstate travel by a person. In fact, the version of the bill 
recommended by the Conference Committee, and adopted by both 
houses, expanded the interstate jurisdictional element to include 
the use of facilities, thereby removing the requirement that the ac­
tual perpetrator cross a state boundary.207 
There is some indication that Congress intended to satisfy con­
cern over the bill's potentially broad scope by limiting the applica­
tion of the bill to specific crimes, rather than focusing on the 
interstate nexus requirement.208 The Attorney General initially ad­
dressed this anticipated concern by clearly demarcating the catego­
ries of activity that his proposal addressed.209 "We specifically have 
outlined the illicit operations we seek to curtail as those involving 
gambling, liquor, narcotics, prostitution businesses, or extortion or 
bribery ...."210 Congress reflected this concern in its deliberations 
over the scope of the bill.211 Congress seemed more concerned, 
however, with the types of criminal activity that the act would apply 
204. See supra Part 1.A.1 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of 
activity contemplated by Congress in enacting the Travel Act. 
205. The Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: 
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Corrim., supra note 18, at 15; see also Miller, supra 
note 43, at 189-93. 
206. See Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to the Vice Presi­
dent (Apr. 6, 1961), S. REP. No. 87-644, at 4 (1961), S. REP. No. 87-644, at 4 (1961), 
reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664, 2666 ("The bill which I submit to the Congress 
would impose criminal sanctions upon the person whose work takes him across State or 
National boundaries in aid of certain 'unlawful activities."'). 
207. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 87-1161, at 1-2 (1961); see also S. REp. No. 87-644, at 
5-6 (1961), reprinted in 1961 V.S.C.CAN. 2664, 2666-67. 
208. S. REp. No. 87-644, at 3 (1961) (quoting Attorney General's testimony 
before the committee). 
209. [d. "The travel that would be banned is travel 'in furtherance of a business 
enterprise' which involves gambling, liquor, narcotics, and prostitution offenses or ex­
tortion or bribery." Id. 
210. [d. 
211. [d. at 2. 
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to,212 and that there be a firm connection drawn between the crimi­
nal activity and the actual travel,213 rather than limiting jurisdiction 
through the degree of interstate activity involved. In fact, Con­
gress' only direct discussion of the interstate nexus requirement was 
to mention that there must be a "proper" one.214 
The murder-for-hire statute has similar inherent limiting char­
acteristics. First, the activity addressed by the statute is very clearly 
limited to situations where there is "intent that a murder be com­
mitted ... for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or 
agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value ...."215 Second, the 
legislative history states that murder-for-hire is the type of crime 
that should be subject to the investigative and prosecutorial re­
sources of the Federal Government.216 Congress limited the reach 
of the statute, in some degree, through a strict limitation on the 
category of activity prohibited. 
Murder-for-hire is a specific category of activity. The crime, 
however, may not necessarily have an interstate element. Any mur­
der-for-hire scheme will have an additional transaction that could 
serve to attenuate the perpetrator from the end result of the crimi­
nal activity, which compounds the nefarious nature of the crime. 
The person committing the murder-for-hire could remain in safety 
some distance from the actual murder, which creates the same 
threat that Congress contemplated in drafting the Travel Act.217 In 
and of itself, however, murder-for-hire is not a federal crime. An 
interpretation of the § 1958 that requires activity that crosses state 
lines to trigger the statute would balance the need to preserve prin­
ciples of federalism with the need to combat crime that is legiti­
212. The House of Representatives limited the application of § 1952 by removing 
from the prohibited activities extortion and bribery not connected with the business of 
gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prostitution. This was accomplished by defining "unlaw­
ful activity" as "any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor, narcotics, or prosti­
tution offenses." See Pollner, supra note 18, at 39. 
213. S. REP. No. 87-644, at 2,5 (1961). "[T]o come within the provisions of the 
bill some activity in furtherance of a racketeering enterprise, subsequent to the per­
formance of the travel, must take place and that accordingly the gravamen of the of­
fense will be travel and a further overt act to aid the enterprise." Id. 
214. See S. REp. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484. 
215. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (2000). 
216. "However, the Committee believes that the option of Federal investigation 
and prosecution should be available when a murder is committed or planned as consid­
eration for something of pecuniary value ...." S. REp. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484. 
217. See supra notes 200-204. 
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mately of federal concern and exceeds the crime fighting abilities of 
local authorities. 
The best interpretation of § 1958 is one that requires that a 
facility be used in an interstate manner in order to trigger the stat­
ute. This interpretation gives effect to the entire statute and ac­
cords with Congress' intent and purpose when drafting the statute. 
This interpretation also accords with legislative and judicial treat­
ment of the Travel Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Courts have interpreted 18 U.S.c. § 1958 in a number of differ­
ent ways, each with varying implications for the jurisdictional reach 
of the murder-for-hire statute. The disagreement focuses on the in­
terpretation of the phrase "use a facility in interstate . . . com­
merce" and is complicated by an apparent discrepancy in the text of 
the statute. Interpreting the statute as applying to any use of a fa­
cility of interstate commerce risks bringing traditionally state crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, even where the 
interaction with interstate commerce is unintended or random. 
Federal jurisdiction under these circumstances becomes inconsis­
tent and fortuitous for the Federal Government. 
An interpretation of § 1958 that requires that there be an inter­
state transaction associated with the murder-for-hire would require 
an inquiry into the particular facts of any murder-for-hire scheme 
prosecuted by the Federal Government. This approach, however, is 
supported by the text of the statute, by the legislative history of the 
statute, and by a thorough analysis of the varying judicial interpre­
tations of § 1958 and the reasoning relied upon therein. Further, an 
interpretation of § 1958 that requires a factual inquiry to determine 
whether the particular use involved an interstate transaction would 
limit federal jurisdiction to those crimes that are legitimately 
federal. 
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